A prime goal of Lattice-based cryptosystems is to provide an enhanced security assurance by remaining secure with respect to quantum computational complexity, while remaining practical on conventional computer systems. In this paper, we define and analyze a superclass of GGH-style nearly-orthogonal bases for use in private keys, together with a subclass of Hermite Normal Forms for use in Miccianciostyle public keys and discuss their benefits when used in Bounded Distance Decoding cryptosystems in general lattices. We propose efficient methods for the creation of such nearly-orthogonal private bases and "Optimal" Hermite Normal Forms and discuss timing results for these methods. Finally, we propose a class of cryptosystems based on the use of these constructions and provide a fair comparison between this class of cryptosystems and related cryptosystems.
Introduction

Post-Quantum Cryptography
The intractability of both integer-factorization and the discrete logarithm problem have long been used to construct asymmetric-key cryptosystems and prove such cryptosystems secure. In 1994, Shor's paper "Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring" [42] rendered these two problems tractable on a quantum computer. As a result of the continual advancements in quantum computer architecture, new one-way trapdoor functions must be developed that will remain secure after quantum computers become practical. One promising avenue of research in this direction is lattice-based cryptography.
Lattice-Based Cryptography Overview
Since Ajtai's seminal paper "Generating hard instances of Lattice problems" [2] , there has been an ongoing effort by the cryptographic community to produce a practical yet secure lattice-based (see Def. 1) cryptosystem based on lattice problems [6] . It is believed that such lattice problems remain hard in quantum complexity [1] , providing strong indications that lattice-based cryptosystems remain secure assuming the existence of quantum computers. This is immensely beneficial for parties who need to retain long term data privacy, beyond the foreseeable advent of practical, large-scale quantum computers.
Definition 1.
A lattice L is a discrete sub-group of R n , or equivalently the set of all the integral combinations of d ≤ n linearly independent vectors over R.
We will refer L B as a lattice of basis B. In this paper, full-rank lattices will be used (simplifying some definitions accordingly) and be represented by a matrix of the basis vectors, in row-vector form. Many lattice problems are based on distance minimization. Distance is measured in a lattice system by a norm, denoted . . In this paper, the euclidean norm as defined in Def. 2 will be used for some calculations. In addition, the l ∞ -norm, also known as the infinity norm or the max norm, will also be used as defined in Def. 3. The induced matrix norm as defined in Def. 4 is also required.
Definition 2. Let H be a Hilbert space of some finite dimension d. Given a vector v ∈ H, v
Definition 4. Let A ∈ R n,n be a matrix. Then a matrix norm denoted as A is said to be consistent to a vector norm .
Both matrix norm . ∞ and . 2 can be easily computed [17] . In this paper, we also use x as the closest integer of x if x ∈ R or the closest vector with integer coefficient if x ∈ R n .
Existing Lattice Cryptosystems
Cryptosytems in q-ary lattices. In 1997, Ajtai and Dwork [4] proposed a cryptosystem such that its security is based on a variant of the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) called the unique Shortest Vector Problem. This cryptosystem received wide attention due to a surprising security proof based on worst-case assumptions. Nonetheless, due to extreme ciphertext expansion, this cryptosystem is merely a theoretical proposition and it cannot be used in practice. Furthermore, Nguyen and Stern presented a heuristic attack against this cryptosystem [32] . Since then, this initial proposition has been improved [16, 7, 22] and inspired many other cryptosystems based on SVP [38, 39, 3] . For a more detailed examination of SVP-based trapdoors, we refer the readers to [40] .
